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Abstract 
While much of the recent literature on mechanisms has emphasized the superiority of 
mechanisms and mechanistic explanation over laws and nomological explanation, 
paradigmatic mechanisms—e.g., clocks or synapses – actually exhibit a great deal of 
stability in their behavior.  And while mechanisms of this kind are certainly of great 
importance, there are many events that do not occur as a consequence of the operation of 
stable mechanisms.  Events of natural and human history are often the consequence of 
causal processes that are ephemeral and capricious.  In this paper I shall argue that, 
notwithstanding their ephemeral nature, these processes deserve to be called mechanisms.  
Ephemeral mechanisms share important characteristics with their more stable cousins, 
and these shared characteristics will help us to understand connections between scientific 
and historical explanation. 
 
  1 
 
  
Hempel (1942) argued that historical explanations, if they were to be truly 
explanatory, must have the same form as scientific explanations – namely, they must be 
covering law explanations.  Covering law explanations explain by deducing the 
explanandum from statements describing particular facts and background conditions 
together with covering laws.  Philosophers have raised serious questions about the 
adequacy of the covering law model, but the question of how scientific and historical 
explanations are related remains. 
To clarify the question of this paper, I must say something about what I 
understand by the term ‗historical explanation‘.  I will take it to be the defining 
characteristic of an historical explanation that it explains the occurrence of some 
particular event or state of affairs by describing how it came to be.  Given this 
characterization of what constitutes an historical explanation, historical explanation is 
equally the province of those concerned with human and with natural history.  It is 
certainly true that many or even most explanations given by historians would be 
historical in my sense: a historian seeking to explain the causes of the rise of Greek city 
states or the collapse of the British Empire would be providing an explanation of how 
certain particular events came to occur.  But at the same time, people we typically call 
natural scientists offer explanations that are historical in this same sense; these range 
from ecological explanations of extinctions to geological explanations of the formation of 
particular features of a landscape, or astrophysical explanations of the formation of the 
solar system.  What unites these forms of explanation across the natural and human 
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sciences is their narrative character: they provide stories about how something came to 
pass. 
There is a second way in which we might understand the term ‗historical 
explanation‘.  We might take it simply to refer to the set of explanatory forms and 
practices utilized by the discipline of history.  Construed this way, ‗historical 
explanation‘, like ‗scientific explanation‘ refers not to a particular kind of explanation but 
to a collection of activities in need of philosophical explication.  If we consider what 
delineates the work of professional historians it is not so much a particular explanatory 
(or other) methodology, but a subject matter.  Professional historians are not concerned 
with the history of just anything, but with the history of human beings – their politics, 
their culture, their technology and so on.  When we contrast historical and scientific 
explanation in this way, it brings to the fore an important philosophical question 
concerning the relationship between the natural and human sciences (Natur- and 
Geisteswissenshaften).  Some philosophers maintain that the fact that human beings form 
the primary subject of history and the other human sciences has profound implications for 
how practitioners can or should explain phenomena in their field of inquiry.    According 
to this view, sometimes called anti-naturalism, explanations in human history require 
reference to concepts such as agency, intention and meaning that do not admit of 
naturalistic reduction and are not necessary or appropriate in explanations of natural 
phenomena.
1
 The contrary view, naturalism, holds that, at least ideally, the subject and 
methods of the natural and human sciences should be continuous.  Hempel‘s attempt to 
find a function for general laws in history falls within this naturalist tradition.  Regardless 
                                                 
1
 The argument for the supposedly distinctive character of the natural and the human sciences goes back to 
the hermeneutical tradition of the nineteenth century, especially to the work of Dilthey.  A classic 
contemporary statement of the position is given by Taylor (1971). 
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of what view one holds with regard to this debate, it should be clear that both the natural 
and human sciences sometimes offer explanations that are historical in the first sense of 
explaining how particular events occurred, and that there may be interesting common 
features of historical explanations across the natural and human sciences. 
My primary focus in this paper is on providing an analysis of historical 
explanation in the first rather than the second sense, but I will want to say something 
about how the two senses of historical explanation are related.  For the sake of simplicity 
in exposition I shall reserve the term ‗historical explanation‘ for the first sense, and I shall 
use the term ‗human-scientific explanation‘ for the second sense.  I do not need or want 
to get involved in boundary disputes about what counts among the human sciences or 
how clear the distinction between the natural and human sciences is.  It is enough that we 
understand the human sciences to include history and the natural sciences to include 
disciplines like biology, geology and physics. 
Given these stipulations regarding terminology it should be clear that historical 
explanation should be contrasted not with natural-scientific explanation but with 
ahistorical explanation.  Ahistorical explanations abstract from particular events at 
particular places and times in order to explain recurrent patterns of phenomena.  If one 
seeks to explain how stars generate energy, how meiosis works or why proteins fold, one 
does not explain a particular event, but some sort of repeatable phenomenon.  While there 
may be subtle differences in particular instances, the same explanation works for 
potentially countless instances of that kind of phenomenon.  While arguably professional 
historians tend to focus more than scientists on the explanation of particular events, 
ahistorical explanation need not be the exclusive province of natural scientists.  An 
  4 
historian who seeks a generalized explanation of some recurrent phenomenon in human 
history is concerned with ahistorical explanation 
 To clarify the relation between historical and ahistorical patterns of explanation, I 
will consider the relationship between three approaches to explanation, all of which are in 
some ways reactions to covering law approaches.  The first two approaches are both 
sometimes called causal-mechanical.  One, developed chiefly by Salmon (1984; 1990) 
seeks to explain events by locating them within what Salmon calls the ―causal nexus.‖  I 
shall refer to this as the causal-nexus approach.  The second, developed by a number of 
philosophers with special interests in the life sciences (Glennan 2002; Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2005; Craver 2007), explains events as products of robust and regular 
systems and processes.  I‘ll refer to this approach as the mechanistic systems approach. 
The third approach is the tradition of narrative explanation, which has traditionally been 
considered a foundational theory of historical explanation (Danto 1985). I will argue that 
certain problems that beset narrative explanation are closely related to those that trouble 
Salmon‘s process approach.  The problems in both cases can be solved by borrowing 
elements of the mechanistic systems approach.  In particular, I‘ll argue that narratives are 
descriptions of what I‘ll call ephemeral mechanisms.  By understanding the relationship 
between ephemeral mechanisms and their more robust cousins, we will gain a better 
understanding of the relationship between historical and ahistorical forms of explanation. 
The Causal Nexus 
 
In his groundbreaking Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the 
World (1984), Salmon repudiated the covering law model of explanation.  Though a 
sympathetic expositor of Hempelian approaches to explanation, Salmon concluded that 
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the DN model and its successors could not meet well-known counterexamples.  His 
diagnosis was that, contra Hempel, explanations should be about causes rather than laws, 
and that a proper explanation involved not an argument that showed that the 
explanandum was to be expected given the truth of certain statements about laws and 
initial conditions, but rather involved a description of the causal processes and 
interactions that bring about the event whose explanation we are seeking.
2
 
On Salmon‘s view, to explain show something is to describe its place in the 
causal nexus.   The causal nexus (or the causal structure of the world as he sometimes 
calls it) is conceived of as a vast network of intersecting causal processes.  When two 
causal processes interact and produce changes in each other, this is called a causal 
interaction. 
We can visualize the causal nexus in terms of the figure below: 
 
Figure 1: The Causal Nexus 
 
Reading from left to right in the diagram, we see processes developing through 
space-time.  Points of intersections are causal interactions between these processes, 
                                                 
2
 For a thorough history of the development and ultimate failure of the covering law approach written from 
Salmon‘s point of view, see his (1990). 
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where the processes are changed or marked by their interaction.  The vertical dimension 
represents levels of analysis.  Depending upon the grain of description, a region in space-
time may be described as a single event (the intersection) or a complicated and spatio-
temporally extended region of further intersecting processes.  We can, for instance, 
conceive of the firing of a neuron as a point event precipitated by interactions with other 
neurons, or we can look at the mechanisms at work within the cell and synapse, and give 
a spatiotemporally extended account of the relevant processes. 
Salmon suggests that we explain things by locating them within the causal nexus.  
Because the causal nexus is immensely complicated, involving enormous numbers of 
events extending indefinitely back in time, no actual explanation can be complete.  
Pragmatic considerations will determine what portions of the causal nexus are actually 
described in some request for an explanation. 
Salmon takes explananda to be events, where these are changes in processes 
occurring in particular regions within space-time.  The explanations of these events are in 
an important sense historical.  One explains by describing events and connecting 
processes within the explanandum event‘s past that ultimately were causally related to the 
occurrence of the event.  The historical character of Salmon‘s approach suggests that the 
model might be applicable not only to the sorts of examples Salmon uses (explaining why 
the baseball broke the window or what caused the mayor to get paresis), but could also be 
used to offer explanations of more typical target explananda in natural and human history 
(e.g., the death of the dinosaurs or the fall of the Roman empire). 
While there is an extensive literature that raises questions about Salmon‘s 
account, I want to focus on a pair of related criticisms that are particularly relevant for 
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understanding the relation of Salmon‘s view to the systems and narrative approaches I 
will turn to next.  The first of these has been formulated most pointedly by Christopher 
Hitchcock (1995).  Hitchcock‘s view is that Salmon‘s account fails to solve the problem 
of explanatory relevance.  To illustrate his claim, Hitchcock asks us to consider a simple 
explanation of a certain event, an eight ball landing in the corner pocket.  The player 
strikes the cue ball with the cue stick, the cue ball begins to roll in the direction of the 
eight ball, striking it and thereby imparting to it the necessary momentum to land it in the 
corner pocket.    For Salmon, causal processes are paths through space time of entities 
that maintain stable structures and which are capable of transmitting marks (changes in 
their properties) through space-time.  The eight ball at rest is a causal process, as is the 
cue ball that moves towards it.  Causal interactions occur when processes intersect and 
transmit marks to each other.  So in this case, the moving cue stick interacts with the cue 
ball; the cue ball begins to roll; the cue ball strikes the eight ball and it beings to roll; the 
eight ball strikes the back of the corner pocket and ceases rolling. 
It might seem that Salmon‘s account works very well here.  We explain the 
location of the eight ball by describing just these processes and interactions, locating the 
event within the causal nexus.  But Hitchcock adds this small complication.  Prior to 
striking the ball, the player chalks the cue stick, and when the cue stick strikes the cue 
ball, the cue ball receives a blue mark.  Thus, in the region where cue ball and cue stick 
interact, there are two changes to the cue ball.  Which one matters?  Hitchcock explains:  
The intuitive relation of explanatory relevance does not hold between regions of 
space-time: it holds between the properties instantiated in certain regions of 
space-time.  We judge that the linear momentum of the cue ball is relevant to the 
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final location of the eight ball, but that the blue color on … the cue ball is not. … 
Nonetheless, Salmon‘s explanations do not seem to cite these properties 
(Hitchcock 1995, 310). 
As Hitchcock points out, this is essentially the same problem that haunted the DN model 
in counterexamples like Kyburg‘s example of hexing salt before dissolving it in water.  
Salmon‘s account can identify events and processes in the past history of the 
explanandum, but it can‘t identify which features of those events are relevant to the 
production of the explanandum. 
 The second problem for Salmon has to do with the grain at which events in the 
causal nexus are described.  As we have already observed, the causal nexus is not just 
characterized horizontally by development of processes through space-time, but vertically 
by constitutive relations between entities and events at different grains.  It is a common 
observation in discussions of explanation that proper explanations must describe 
processes at a grain which captures the explanatorily salient features.  In explaining why 
the spy was captured, we cite the fact that the mole in the CIA gave information to the 
KGB.  What matters for the explanation is simply that the information was transmitted, 
and not exactly what the medium of transmission was.  It doesn‘t matter if the 
information was written, spoken or transferred on a flash drive.  As in the cue ball case, 
choosing the wrong grain involves identifying factors that are explanatorily irrelevant. 
 This problem is perhaps most evident if we consider a revision Salmon made to 
his theory of causal processes and interactions (Salmon 1994).  Responding to concerns 
that his account of processes and interactions contained an inappropriate counterfactual 
element, Salmon adopted a definition of a causal interaction in which interactions were 
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defined as intersections of processes involving exchange of physically conserved 
quantities.  I will not discuss the merits of this approach here, but it is at least clear that 
this characterization of an interaction takes us away from the explanatorily salient 
features of events.  The phone call to the KGB may involve exchange of conserved 
quantities, but that‘s not why the spy was captured. 
Mechanistic systems 
 While Salmon sometimes called his account of explanation mechanistic, he 
offered no definitions of mechanisms as such.  The more recent mechanistic systems 
approach, explicitly characterizes mechanisms as robust systems or processes consisting 
of interacting parts.
3
  The position has been championed in the last decade by Bechtel, 
Craver, Darden, Glennan and Machamer, but has its roots in earlier criticisms of covering 
law model.  The mechanists argue that scientists (especially in the biological and social 
sciences) seldom frame their discoveries and explanations in terms of laws of nature, and 
commonly do so in terms of mechanisms.  Accordingly they believe that explanations in 
these areas should be understood as providing descriptions of the mechanisms that 
produce the explanandum phenomenon. 
 Mechanisms are systems that produce some phenomenon, behavior or function.  
The system may have the capacity to produce that behavior in virtue of deliberate design: 
the washer is designed to wash clothes; or natural selection: the eye is, in virtue of natural 
selection, able to detect light within a certain frequency range; or it may behave that way 
simply as a matter of historical contingency: Old faithful has the capacity to produce 
                                                 
3
 See Glennan (2002) for a more extended discussion of the relationship between causal nexus approach 
and the mechanistic systems approach.  In that paper, I  characterize the former approach as the process 
approach and the latter approach as the systems approach. 
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geysers at regular intervals.  Given a target phenomenon, one can ask what mechanism 
produces it, regardless of how the mechanism came to be. 
 Mechanisms behave in regular but not exceptionless ways.  The washer could 
break; the eye could go blind; geologic changes could make Old Faithful less faithful.  
The behavior of mechanisms can be described by what Craver (2007) calls 
―mechanistically fragile generalizations.‖  These are generalizations that are robust and 
non-accidental, but hold in virtue of the fact that they describe the behavior of the 
mechanism.  That mechanism is a system with a stable spatial, temporal and causal 
structure in which the parts of the mechanisms act in regular ways to produce the 
mechanism‘s behavior.  Just as the behavior of the mechanism as a whole is regular but 
not exceptionless, so is the behavior of the mechanism‘s parts.  Glennan (2002) suggests 
that the interactions between parts of mechanisms can be characterized by ―invariant 
change-relating generalizations.‖  These generalizations are counterfactual supporting 
generalizations that describe how a change in a property of one or more parts produces a 
change in the property of another part.  Like the generalizations describing the behavior 
of the mechanism as a whole, these generalizations are mechanistically fragile.  This is 
because in general the parts themselves will be complex structures, and the interactions 
between parts will be mechanically explicable and subject to breakdowns (see Glennan 
1996).  A mechanistic explanation of the human body‘s capacity to deliver oxygen to the 
brain will describe the various parts of the respiratory and circulatory systems that bring 
oxygen into the lung, transfer it to the blood stream and carry it to the brain.  But the 
parts of this system (e.g., the heart, the lungs, the red blood cells) will themselves have 
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parts, and the behavior of these parts and the way that they interact with each other will 
be explained by describing lower-level mechanisms. 
 The most important difference between the causal-nexus and the systems 
approach is that mechanistic system explanations explain regular or type-level 
phenomena, whereas Salmon seeks in the first instance to provide explanations of 
particular events.  Mechanists are interested in descriptions of how kinds of mechanisms 
work: for instance, what is the mechanism by which neurons signal across synapses?  
Whatever this mechanism is, there are countless such neurons in organisms on this 
planet, and those neurons fire countless times. 
 While on this view mechanisms are stable and organized systems of parts, the 
operation of these mechanisms give rise to processes; in this example the operation of the 
synaptic mechanism is a process of neuron firing.  But because these processes are 
regular and repeatable, they are different from the sort of processes Salmon appeals to in 
his explanations.  On Salmon‘s account the explanandum is a particular event occurring 
ia a particular region in space-time, and the explanation consists of describing in part the 
set of processes and interactions in that space-time region that produce that event.  On the 
systems mechanist view, one explains events by showing them to be the product of the 
operation of some type of mechanism on some occasion. 
 The systems approach avoids the difficulties concerning explanatory relevance 
that trouble Salmon‘s account.4  Interactions between parts of mechanism are not 
characterized by some generic property like mark transmission or exchange of conserved 
quantities, but by generalizations describing about how changes in properties of one part 
                                                 
4
 See Craver (2007) and Glennan (2002, 2009) for more detailed accounts of how mechanistic explanations 
solve the relevance problem. 
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bring about changes in properties of another part.  For instance, specific neurotransmitters 
bind with specific types of receptors in virtue of the biochemical properties of those 
molecules.  They also avoid the grain problem.  The hierarchical aspect of the systems 
mechanism approach guarantees that the decomposition of a system into parts is done at a 
level that is required to characterize the causally relevant interactions between parts. 
 Systems mechanisms have a historical dimension in the sense that the 
generalizations describing the behavior of these mechanisms are true only in virtue of the 
particular organization and interaction of parts, and of the historical processes that 
brought them about.  All of the myriad mechanisms at work in the life of organisms exist 
only in virtue of those organisms‘ evolutionary and developmental history.  The laws one 
finds in biology, such as they are, are as Beatty (1995) says ―evolutionarily contingent.‖  
But while the fact that there will always be a history that explains why a certain 
mechanism exists and behaves as it does, one need not know that history to explain how 
the mechanism works.  For instance, one needs no account of the evolutionary 
significance of meiosis, in order to describe the mechanism of meiosis.  Thus, 
mechanistic explanations themselves appear to be ahistorical.  They describe the regular 
operations of reliable mechanisms.  It is for this reason that this approach needs 
modification to serve the needs of historical explanation.  
Narrative Explanations 
Historical explanations are typically narratives.  Richards tells us ―[n]arratives fix 
events along a temporal dimension, so that prior events are understood to have given rise 
to subsequent events and thereby to explain them‖ (1992, 23).  Narratives are often 
described as sequences as events, but they are perhaps better characterized as a branching 
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tree of events with the root of the tree being the terminating event of the narrative, and 
the object of explanation.  So described, we can see an obvious similarity between 
historical narratives and Salmon‘s explanation by description of the causal nexus.  The 
branches converging towards the explanandum event look just like those in figure 1. 
 Philosophers interested in historical narrative have focused on a variety of issues 
in the theory of narrative, but perhaps the chief among them is the problem of how the 
events in the narrative chain are linked.  Hempel (1942) argued that any narrative, if it 
were to be truly explanatory, would have to have each link in the chain established by a 
covering law explanation (either deterministic or statistical).  A proper narrative would 
show how each link in the narrative chain is, to use a phrase of Salmon‘s, nomically 
expectable.  The view can be criticized on a number of grounds, many of which are 
familiar from critiques of covering law models in the natural sciences.  First,  many 
would argue that there are few if any lawful generalizations that can cover these 
explananda; second, we may be suspicious of Hempel‘s requirement that the explanation 
should show that the event was to be expected (the so-called high probability 
requirement); third, we may wonder more generally if narrative explanations get their 
explanatory force from connection to laws. 
 Richards‘ brief characterization of narrative implies what defenders of narrative 
take for granted – that the links in the narrative chain describe causal links between 
events.  And in some part, the negative reaction to Hempel is a reaction to Hempel‘s 
Humean view that causal claims must be reduced to claims about regularities.  What the 
historian denies is the connection between causation on the one hand and generality on 
the other.  Richards suggests that ―the historian … will recognize lawlike generalizations 
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only after events have been laid out in temporal sequence and understood immediately as 
productive‖ (Richards , 45)   
The key notion here is causation as productivity rather than generality.  But if one 
does not by appeal to generality, the question remains of how one recognizes intersecting 
processes as productive of events.  This is Salmon‘s problem of causal relevance, 
reappearing in the context of narrative explanation.  The task of the historian is to 
construct a narrative in which the events described are causally relevant, but the theory of 
narrative so far described gives us little account of how we establish causal relevance. 
A second problem is again analogous to a problem for Salmon‘s account, and that 
is the problem of explanatory grain.  One of the curious but recurrent features of 
historical narratives is their sometimes rapidly shifting scales.  For instance, in giving a 
narrative explanation of the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, it is commonplace to 
describe the details of the psychological state of commanders, and at the same time to 
describe the actions of much larger grained entities (regiments, divisions and corps).  
While intuitively we understand this practice, a theory of narrative needs to explain why 
these shifting scales are explanatory. 
Ephemeral Mechanisms 
 
 Mechanists solve the causal relevance problem that plagues both Salmon‘s causal 
nexus approach and the narrative approach by characterizing causal interactions between 
parts of mechanisms in terms of robust, though contingent and mechanically explicable 
generalizations about the regular relationships between changing properties of the 
mechanism‘s parts.  But because the mechanistic approach focuses on types of systems 
that exhibit regular and repeatable behavior, it must be modified to provide an 
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explanatory model adequate to the singular causal sequences that characterize historical 
narratives. 
 It is not a stretch to use the term ‗mechanism‘ in connection with the explanation 
of singular occurrences.  What was the mechanism or mechanisms responsible for the 
death of the dinosaurs or the fall of the Roman Empire, for instance?  But if this locution 
is not strained, we should expect some connection between the mechanistic approach and 
historical explanations.  What seems to distinguish mechanisms in this historical sense 
from mechanistic systems is that the circumstances that bring together the various entities 
whose interactions constitute the narrative are ephemeral.  The difficulty of predicting the 
future course of history stems from the dependence of historical outcomes on chance 
conspiracies of circumstances, but once we have identified what those circumstances are, 
a good narrative explains by showing how, given those circumstances, there was a 
likelihood or necessity to the outcome. 
 To explore the ephemeral character of narrative, consider a narrative explanation 
of a particular event, the death of the French literary critic, Roland Barthes.  Barthes died 
in 1980 at the age of 64.  Barthes had been invited to a luncheon with then president 
Francois Mitterrand, and was struck by a laundry truck while crossing a Paris street on 
his way home.  Barthes was an important figure in French letters, and arguably the 
history of literary theory was significantly changed by Barthes‘ untimely meeting with 
the laundry truck. 
 Barthes‘ death was caused by what I‘ll call an ephemeral mechanism.  
Specifically, I take an ephemeral mechanism to be a collection of interacting parts where: 
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1. the interactions between parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-
relating generalizations  
2. the configuration of parts may be the product of chance or exogenous factors 
3. the configuration of parts is short-lived and non-stable, and is not an instance of a 
multiply-realized type. 
Condition one, the idea that mechanisms are collections of parts that interact in 
accordance with direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations comes from (Glennan 
2002).  Conditions two and three loosen certain constraints on the relationship between 
parts that are implicit in calling mechanisms systems or robust processes. 
Applying this definition to the mechanism responsible for Barthes‘ death, we note 
that the parts include among other things Barthes, Mitterrand and the other attendees at 
the luncheon, a host of physical objects with which Barthes interacted on his journey 
(stoplights, sidewalks, etc.),  and a laundry truck.    Condition two suggests that these 
parts must have come together in the places and times they did in virtue of chance or 
exogenous factors.  This is not meant to exclude some historical mechanisms in which 
there are non-chance factors.  If the truck driver and the waiters at the lunch are both 
working for a conspiracy of rival critics intent on bringing about Barthes‘ demise, then 
that interaction would not be by chance.  But regardless of whether the death was an 
accident, the mechanism of death meets condition three. The configuration of parts is 
short-lived and non-stable.  Barthes does not regularly go to lunch with Mitterand or 
regularly get run over by laundry trucks.  Had the timing or locations been off by just a 
bit, Barthes would not have died.  Moreover, the mechanism of Barthes‘ death is not an 
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instance of a multiply realizable type.  Unlike guillotines, laundry trucks do not regularly 
kill French citizens. 
The fact that ephemeral mechanisms meet conditions two and three make it 
inappropriate to call such mechanisms systems.  There is nothing systematic in the 
operation of the mechanism that caused Barthes‘ death.  But if this is so, what is the 
connection between ephemeral mechanisms and mechanistic systems?  The connection 
lies in the constraints imposed by condition one.  The same sorts of generalizations which 
characterize the interactions between parts of ordinary mechanisms also characterize 
interactions between the parts of ephemeral mechanisms.  The appeal to these 
generalizations captures the robust and reliable nature of the interactions between parts of 
the ephemeral mechanism.   
 I would suggest that we construe narrative explanations as descriptions of 
ephemeral mechanisms.  So for instance, in giving a narrative account of the death of 
Barthes, we describe the mechanism responsible for his death.  My contention is that by 
seeing narratives in this way, we can solve the problems of causal relevance and 
explanatory grain that pose problems for narrative explanation. 
In ephemeral mechanisms, while the manner in which parts come together is 
chance or unpredictable, how they will interact with each other is not.  We can describe 
the interaction between Barthes and the laundry truck as an instance of a change-relating 
generalization involving persons and laundry trucks, or persons and large vehicles.  The 
laundry truck injures Barthes in virtue of certain causally relevant properties (notably its 
solidity and momentum) and not in virtue of other of its properties (for instance, the name 
of the laundry service painted on the side).  We know this because we can identify 
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counterfactual supporting generalizations describing how interactions between entities 
with the causally relevant properties of the laundry truck bring about changes in the 
functioning of human bodies.  
This appeal to change-relating generalizations is reminiscent of Hempel‘s 
requirement that the links in narrative chains be explained by appeal to covering laws.   
The difference, however, is that these generalizations are not exceptionless universal 
generalizations, but are instead mechanically explicable and subject to breakdowns.  For 
instance, if we were to describe how changes in the general‘s plan led to changes in the 
position of a regiment on a battlefield, we could appeal to a generalization about how 
orders from generals affect regiments.  When generals order regiments to march, they 
typically march.  But this is no law of nature.  It is true only in virtue of the operations of 
mechanisms of command and control, and these mechanisms can break down in a variety 
of ways – for instance through garbled communications or mutinies. 
 The mechanistic approach also helps us understand explanatory grain.  Why is it 
that we focus on Barthes and the laundry truck, rather than say parts of Barthes and the 
laundry truck‘s bumper?  In the first place, the laundry truck and Barthes are objects (cf. 
Glennan 1996), in the sense that the are spatially localized seats of properties which are 
generally stable in the absence of interventions.  Bumpers are (in contexts like this) 
attached to the rest of the truck, accelerate with the rest of the truck, etc.  Moreover, the 
generalizations invoked in characterizing interactions between parts will be at the grain of 
these objects.  The fatal effect of the laundry truck has principally to do with the 
massiveness and inelasticity of the whole truck.  Unattached truck bumpers do not have 
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the sort of momentum that is productive of the kinds of injuries that result from collisions 
with whole trucks.  
In the Poetics, Aristotle develops a theory of plots that is much like the theory of 
narrative I am proposing.   Aristotle says the best plots must exhibit unity of action, 
necessity and peripity.  Unity of action for Aristotle is essentially a demand that the 
events in the plot (or narrative) are causally relevant to the outcome, and the demand for 
necessity is a demand that the events in the narrative chain are causally linked.  Peripity, 
which Aristotle claims is the feature of the best tragedies, involves sequences of events 
that occur ―unexpectedly and at the same time in consequence of one another‖ (1452a).  
Aristotle is talking about imaginative plots, but we can see that this peripity will also be 
characteristic of the best historical narratives.  Such explanations will take events that are 
surprising or mysterious, and show how they arise probably or necessarily out of some 
sequence of events. 
But the demand for probability or necessity might, it could be argued, be too 
strong.  To see this, consider a narrative explanation of the demise of an unfortunate 
graduate student.  In a relatively short space of time, the graduate student‘s mother dies in 
an accident, his girlfriend leaves him, and he fails his comprehensive exams.  In a fit of 
despair, he commits suicide.  But while we‘ll suppose that these events occasioned the 
student‘s suicide, the student‘s decision still surprises us.  To put it another way, unlike 
the case of the interaction between Barthes and the truck, there is no robust generalization 
that whenever students are confronted with these circumstances they will commit suicide. 
While we are sometimes offered narratives in which the links of the narrative do not 
seem to reliable generalizations, I do not think it requires us to give up our account of 
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narrative explanation.  I would argue that to the extent that a narrative fails to show the 
necessity of the outcome, it fails to explain.  And this certainly seems the case with our 
hypothetical student.  For in such a case, while we might grant that the traumatic events 
occasioned the suicide, we really have no explanation of what about the particular 
circumstances necessitated the action. 
Explanatory Patterns and Generalized Narratives 
 The historical explanations I have been considering are singular causal 
explanations of particular events.  I have argued that these explanations are narrative 
explanations, and that narratives should be construed as descriptions of ephemeral 
mechanisms.  Even if one accepts that this is an illuminating analysis of historical 
explanations of particular events, it would be, as I suggested at the outset, a mistake to 
suppose that this is the only sort of explanation one finds in history and the human 
sciences.  One sort of activity that is clearly of interest to many historians is finding 
recurrent patterns in history, and seeing how a particular sequence of events follows a 
pattern often is explanatory.  In this section I‘d like to say something about how these 
explanatory patterns are connected to mechanistic explanations, ephemeral and 
otherwise. 
 Let us consider how to explain the events in the fall of 2008 that led to the global 
stock market crash.  Arguably there are at least two ways to explain this event.  One way 
would focus on providing a narrative of the particular events that led to panicky sell-offs 
of particular stocks and the demise of particular companies.  Such a narrative would 
focus on particular decisions of the U.S. Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve and 
other parties, like the decision not to bail out Lehman Brothers.  An explanation of this 
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sort is, according to the analysis I‘ve offered, a description of an ephemeral mechanism.  
The second way of explaining the market crash would be to show how it exemplifies a 
familiar pattern of economic behavior.  At the simplest level, the crash was the result of a 
speculative market bubble.  Market bubbles are a recurrent feature of economic systems 
throughout modern history – from the speculation in shares of the French Mississippi 
Company in the 1720s to the dot com bubble of the late 1990s to the real estate bubble of 
2008.  Viewed from this perspective, the stock market crash of 2008 is not the product of 
an ephemeral mechanism, but of a mechanism of a more robust and predictable sort. 
 Explanations of this sort actually fit nicely within the systems conception of 
mechanism.  A market is a mechanism consisting of a number of parts – buyers, sellers, 
products, money, etc.  The actions of and interactions between these parts can be 
described by change-relating generalizations – for instance, generalizations describing 
changes in buying behavior in response to changes in price of products.  Collectively, the 
structure of and interactions between these parts entail that the mechanism will behave in 
regular and predictable ways.  An explanation of how a market works in general and how 
it will under a variety of conditions give rise to a bubble is not an historical explanation 
in the narrow sense that I stipulated at the beginning of this paper, but it is nonetheless a 
sort of explanation that historians are interested in.  Explanations of this sort are 
analogous to mechanistic explanations in science where a scientist seeks to explain a 
repeatable phenomena (photosynthesis, annealing of metals, etc.) by showing it to be the 
product of a certain sort of mechanism of which there are many instances that operate on 
many occasions. 
  22 
 While such explanations are general and not historical in the sense of this paper, 
they still have a narrative structure.  As I suggested above, a mechanistic system like a 
synapse gives rise to a regular process like neuron firing.  The various activities and 
interactions of the parts of the mechanism that constitute this process do, to use Richards‘ 
characterization of narrative, ―fix events along a temporal dimension, so that prior events 
are understood to have given rise to subsequent events and thereby to explain them.‖  But 
the narratives involved in such explanations are generalized narratives.  The 
neuroscientist is not concerned with explaining how a particular neuron fires but how in 
general neurons fire.  Similarly, an economic historian may be interested in explaining 
how in general a market system gives rise to a process that creates a market bubble, 
without seeking to explain a particular bubble.  In both cases, we achieve understanding 
in part by recognizing how particular events within generalized narratives.  We come to 
understand a particular event by recognizing it as an instance of ―the same old story.‖  
Explanations of this sort bear some resemblance to covering law explanations.  We do 
see that a particular case falls under a generalization, but this generalization though is 
historically contingent and mechanistically fragile. 
 How ephemeral are the events that historians seek to explain?  There is no general 
answer to this question, but we can observe that how one answers this question in a 
particular case depends to a significant degree upon the grain of explanation one seeks to 
provide.  Historians of World War I frequently claim, first, that the war‘s outbreak was 
caused by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and, second, that 
World War I was essentially inevitable given the political alliances and enmities in 
Europe, the arms race, the system for mobilizing reserves, and so on.    The first 
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explanation that cites the assassination of the Archduke is highly ephemeral in the sense 
that the ―parts‖ involved in the mechanism came together in a way that was chance and 
unrepeatable.    The second claim holds that the event of World War I was not the 
product of an ephemeral mechanism, but of a complex and stable system of governments, 
alliances and militaries.  But there is no real contradiction here.  We simply have two 
different kinds of explanations of the same explanandum.  If one describes the outbreak 
of the war in a sufficiently fine-grained way – as a particular conflict that began on a 
particular date at a particular place – then the only explanation available is quite 
ephemeral.  But one can describe this same event at a courser grain – as an outbreak of a 
war between the great powers in Europe, for instance – and argue that an event of this 
kind was expected product of the operation of a quite stable mechanism.
5
 
 But while sometimes different assessments of the degree to which historical 
events are ephemeral is a function of different choices of explanatory grain, the question 
of how ephemeral an historical event is can also be a quite substantive one.  Consider two 
examples – one from human history and another from natural history.  Many historians of 
the World War II argue that Allied victory was more-or-less certain once the United 
States entered the War.  On this view, the decisive fact in explaining the outcome of the 
war was that the United States had enormous industrial resources that were safe from 
destruction by its enemies.   According to this view, the industrial dominance would 
guarantee that the same basic outcome would have occurred, even in the face of 
significant variations in facts such as strategic and tactical decisions of generals, 
battlefield outcomes and technological advancements.  The alternate view holds that the 
                                                 
5
 This sort of explanatory pluralism is not just a feature of human history.  Sterelny (1996) makes a parallel 
case for evolutionary biology, distinguishing between what he calls actual sequence and robust process 
explanations. 
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Allied victory was a near thing that depended upon a set of circumstances that were 
highly ephemeral and (from the Allies‘ point of view) fortuitous.  For instance it might be 
argued that the outcome of the war in the Pacific was determined by the battle of 
Midway, an unlikely allied victory that was determined by, among other things, the 
fortunate fact that American aircraft carriers happened to be on maneuvers when the 
Japanese hit Pearl Harbor and the luck and skill of a couple of pilots who landed the 
crucial bombs on Japanese aircraft carriers.   Turning to natural history, consider Stephen 
Jay Gould‘s argument concerning the Cambrian explosion – the rapid appearance of a 
great variety of animals in the Cambrian period.  Gould argues that fauna during the 
Cambrian period were remarkably diverse compared with those that survive in the 
present day.  He argues moreover that the pruning of the tree of life depended a great deal 
upon luck.  There is nothing more fit about the species whose lineages have survived to 
the modern era than those who don‘t.  Gould‘s target in his argument are the so-called 
‗adaptationists‘ who argue that natural selection strongly constrained evolutionary 
outcomes.  According to Gould, if you were to ―rewind the tape‖ small and chance 
variations in circumstances could lead to profound differences in the earth‘s fauna. 
 We need reach no particular conclusions about these examples to see the 
implications for our understanding of the role of ephemeral mechanisms in human and 
natural history.  The degree to which a historical outcome is contingent is a consequence 
of the degree to which the mechanism that produced it was ephemeral.  To some degree, 
how ephemeral the mechanism is will be a function of how finely grained the description 
of the outcome is.  At the same time, even given a fixed grain of description, some events 
will be the product of mechanisms that are more ephemeral than others.  It is part of the 
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business of those interested in historical explanations – natural or human – to debate just 
how ephemeral the mechanisms are. 
Conclusion 
 My goal in this paper has been to suggest that there is a closer connection 
between explanations in the natural sciences and history than is commonly realized.  In 
the first place, I have argued that we should recognize that many explanations in the 
natural sciences are historical in the sense that they seek to explain, like explanations 
offered by political or cultural historians, the causal processes that give rise to particular 
events at particular times.  Second, I have argued that the structure of these explanations 
(whether they be explanations from human or natural history) are narrative in character 
and are connected to a sort of explanation--mechanistic explanation --that can be used to 
provide ahistorical explanations within both the natural and human sciences. 
 Collectively, these similarities in explanatory forms might seem to provide 
evidence that the anti-naturalist position described at the beginning of this paper is 
incorrect.  As I have described it, the anti-naturalist is committed to the view that special 
features of human beings and their culture – agency, intention and meaning – are crucial 
to understanding in the human sciences.  The question I would like to conclude with 
concerns whether these features are somehow incompatible with the mechanistic form of 
explanation I have described.   
 In the first place it should be evident that explanatory narratives often make 
reference to the actions of agents guided by belief, reason and intention.  If narratives of 
human history are descriptions of ephemeral mechanisms, people must be parts of 
mechanisms and their beliefs, intentions and reasons must be among the properties of 
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these parts that are invoked in describing the mechanism.  The naturalist sees no problem 
with this.  These kinds of properties can figure in generalizations describing the 
relationship between parts of mechanisms just as easily as properties of objects described 
in the natural sciences.  The sort of necessity involved in the narrative is in no way 
different.   Hume, one of the earliest proponents of a naturalist position, puts the point 
this way: 
When we consider how aptly natural and moral evidence link together, and form 
one chain of argument, we shall make no scruple to allow that they are of the 
same nature, and derived from the same principles.  A prisoner who has neither 
money nor interest, discovers the impossibility of his escape, as well when he 
considers the obstinacy of the jailor, as the walls and bars with which he is 
surrounded; and, all attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to work upon the 
stone and iron of the one than upon the inflexible nature of the other. (Hume 
1777, 90) 
The defender of the anti-naturalist view may argue that in historical explanation we 
seldom have so determinate relationship between the beliefs, desires and intentions of 
human beings and the actions that determine historical outcomes, but this, the naturalist 
will conclude only reveals our ignorance of the true causes of events. 
 I am sympathetic with the naturalist‘s position because I think that great progress 
has been made in recent years in providing a naturalistic and mechanistic conception of 
meaning and agency -- one that is even compatible with human autonomy and dignity.  
But even if the anti-naturalist is right that there is something irreducibly special about 
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I presented early versions of this paper in talks at the University of Chicago and at 
Washington University in St. Louis, where I benefitted from comments from the 
audiences.  I‘m also grateful for comments from John Beatty and from two anonymous 
referees from Erkenntnis that led to substantial improvements in the final paper. 
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